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INTRODUCTION
The murder of George Floyd by police officers in Minneapolis incited not
only activists in the Black Lives Matter movement but also tens of thousands of
Americans and persons across the globe of all races and ages who now realize
that police reform is necessary to achieve real equality among all persons in the
United States and elsewhere.1 For as long as most Black Americans can remember, police have abused people of color in this country.2 In fact, police
forces were originally created in the United States to catch and return escaped
slaves to their “rightful” owners.3 But only with the recently-required use of police body cameras as well as the proliferation of cell phones that enable videos
shot by bystanders have many other Americans recognized how dire the situation is.4 This recognition has led to inter-racial marches in the streets of major
cities,5 charges against individual police officers for murder,6 and demands for
new legislation on both federal and state levels to reform police practices, to
limit police departments’ jurisdiction, and even to defund or abolish police departments and to redirect funds to social services for poor people.7 No question
1

See, e.g., Anthony Zurcher, George Floyd Death: Three Police Reform Plans Compared,
BBC NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53083560 [https://
perma.cc/FM2Q-94KT]; Weihua Li & Humera Lodhi, The States Taking on Police Reform
After the Death of George Floyd, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 18, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://fivethi
rtyeight.com/features/which-states-are-taking-on-police-reform-after-george-floyd/ [https://p
erma.cc/J66Z-5RMH]; Abdi Latif Dahir et al., George Floyd’s Killing Prompts Africans to
Call for Police Reform at Home, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
07/03/world/africa/george-floyd-protests-police-africa.html [https://perma.cc/V5TV-FQRZ].
2
Anna North, How Racist Policing Took over American Cities, Explained by a Historian,
VOX (June 6, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/6/21280643/police-brutality-viol
ence-protests-racism-khalil-muhammad [https://perma.cc/83DQ-8T58].
3
Id.
4
See Nicol Turner Lee, Where Would Racial Progress in Policing Be Without Camera
Phones?, BROOKINGS (June 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/05/wh
ere-would-racial-progress-in-policing-be-without-camera-phones/ [https://perma.cc/U2RK-A
J9C].
5
A Timeline of the George Floyd and Anti-Police Brutality Protests, ALJAZEERA (June 11,
2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/11/a-timeline-of-the-george-floyd-and-anti-p
olice-brutality-protests; In Pictures: A Racial Reckoning in America, CNN (July 9, 2020,
9:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/27/us/gallery/george-floyd-demonstrations/index.h
tml [https://perma.cc/5NUM-4APV]; George Floyd: Videos of Police Brutality During Protests Shock US, BBC NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-529
32611 [https://perma.cc/M58W-VSFX].
6
Brittany Shammas et al., Murder Charges Filed Against All Four Officers in George
Floyd’s Death as Protests Against Biased Policing Continue, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020,
8:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/03/george-floyd-police-officerscharges/ [https://perma.cc/F4NR-M9N7].
7
Rashawn Ray, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Does It Have Merit?,
BROOKINGS (June 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-
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major reform is necessary. Without it, this country cannot move forward as a
nation that espouses equal treatment of all.
As efforts to reform police practices and to consider redirecting funding to
social service agencies continue, we must understand that individuals with disabilities, especially mental health, intellectual, and sensory perception disabilities, also suffer serious abuse at the hands of police officers.8 Just as a person’s
race increases the risk of arrest, so does a person’s disability.9 In fact, the intersection of Black or Latinx race and disability elevates the risk of arrest and injury dramatically.10 In too many tragic cases, family members of an individual
with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or other mental health disability call police for help transporting the individual to the hospital, but police escalate the
tense situation, leaving the individual dead or seriously injured.11 In other cases,
police shoot deaf individuals who unknowingly fail to follow their directions.12
Given this reality, it is imperative that supporters of the Black Lives Matter
movement consider the intersection of race and disability when making legal
and policy recommendations for change.
This Article discusses the intersectional harms caused by the police to persons of color with disabilities and analyzes the potential use of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)13 to hold police departments liable for

defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/ [https://perma.cc/2B4A-SH3A] (stating that
“defund the police” does not mean abolish the police, but rather means to re-direct funding
to other social service agencies, etc. that should have jurisdiction over many of the matters
police get involved with); Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police.
Here’s What It Means, CNN (June 17, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/u
s/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/TG23-N5SF] (noting that different
people mean different things when they say “defund the police;” some mean redirecting resources from the police to social services agencies while others mean disbanding or abolishing the police force).
8
Even when not looking at police violence specifically, persons with disabilities are 2.5
times more likely to be victims of violent crimes, and those with cognitive disabilities suffer
the most violent crimes of those with disabilities. See ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU JUST. STATS.,
NCJ 250632, CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 2009–2015 STATISTICAL TABLES
3–4 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0915st.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU7R9M2E]; Police Violence, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/policebrutality/ [https://perma.cc/CV48-T5AL].
9
Susan Kelley, People With Disabilities More Likely to Be Arrested, CORNELL CHRON.
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2017/11/people-disabilities-more-likely-bearrested [https://perma.cc/DBD9-8H8F].
10
See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., Hall v. City of Walnut Creek, No. C 19-05716, 2020 WL 408989, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2020); Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014).
12
See, e.g., Shaun King, North Carolina Police Kill Unarmed Deaf Man Who Was Using
Sign Language, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016, 10:49 AM), https://www.nydailynews.co
m/news/national/king-n-police-kill-unarmed-deaf-mute-man-sign-language-article-1.276071
4 [https://perma.cc/P74N-ZY29].
13
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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injuries and deaths suffered during and immediately following arrests.14 First, it
discusses the research establishing that persons of color with disabilities suffer
serious harms at the hands of the police.15 Second, it explores varying interpretations of Title II of the ADA as well as possible amendments to the Act that
would make it more responsive to the needs of those who are wrongfully injured by the police.16 Finally, it recognizes the limitations of lawsuits and encourages others to solve this problem not only through this law, but also
through community alternatives such as redirecting police funding towards resources that support individuals with mental health and other disabilities. 17 The
Article concludes that police reform must focus not only on race but also on the
intersectional harms caused by race and disability in detailing how to interpret
and change policy and law. Moreover, it recognizes that changes in law alone
likely will not provide the relief we need, but that a concerted approach to
changing law and policies on federal, state, and local levels combined with efforts at cultural change may promise important relief from the disregard for life
and limb of our citizens that is now taking place.
I.

DIS/ABLED, OF COLOR, AND VULNERABLE TO POLICE ENCOUNTERS: DATA
AND STORIES

Accurate information about how many people of color with disabilities are
arrested, harmed, and/or killed by police is relatively difficult to find, but there
is no question that police are more dangerous to individuals of color than to
white people.18 And, the research and commentary demonstrate that police violence poses even greater danger to persons of color with disabilities.19 A recent
public health study calculates the cumulative possibility of being arrested by
the age of twenty-eight.20 The study found that while 27.55 percent of whites
have a cumulative probability of arrest before the age of twenty-eight, Blacks
have a cumulative probability of arrest of 37.30 percent during the same time
period.21 The cumulative probability of arrest of persons without disabilities is
29.68 percent, and for those with disabilities the cumulative probability of arrest rises to 42.65 percent.22 When we look at persons with disabilities who are
14

To the extent that the abusive police officers are employees of federal agencies, rather
than of state, county, and city agencies, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would
be applicable. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The same standards are applicable to both Section 504 and
the ADA. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).
15
See discussion infra Part I.
16
See discussion infra Section II.B.
17
See discussion infra Section II.B.2, Conclusion.
18
Erin J. McCauley, The Cumulative Probability of Arrest by Age 28 Years in the United
States by Disability Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1977,
1977–78 (2017).
19
Id. at 1978 tbl.1.
20
Id. at 1977.
21
Id. at 1978 tbl.1.
22
Id.
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Black, the cumulative probability of arrest is 55.17 percent (as opposed to
39.70 percent for whites with disabilities).23 Being male and Black raises the
cumulative probability of arrest for persons with disabilities to 65.73 percent.24
For Latinx individuals, the cumulative probability of arrest of persons without
disabilities is 31.37 percent, and for those with disabilities, it rises to 46.12 percent.25 For Latinx males with disabilities, the percentage rises to 57.69%.26
Clearly, this study demonstrates that at least when it comes to arrests, there is
an intersectional effect on persons of color with disabilities, with even higher
arrest rates for males in these categories. It is likely, given these numbers, that
intersectional disadvantage applies to killings by the police as well.27
Unfortunately, there is no governmentally-operated national database that
catalogues all killings of civilians by police that reports race and disability statistics.28 There are a number of databases, however, operated by the federal
government and news organizations that catalogue deaths of civilians by police,
most of which report race of the victims and at least one (potential) disability
23

Id.
Id. The raw numbers are based on a study of nearly 9,000 individuals who had completed
data on race, gender, and disability for longitudinal surveys from 1997–2014, conducted by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by
Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16793, 16783 (2019).
28
See Kelly Gates, Counting the Uncounted: What the Absence of Data on Police Killings
Reveals, in DIGITAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRATIC FUTURES 121, 121 (Michael X. Delli Carpini
ed., 2019) (discussing on the overall lack of statistics); see also DAVID M. PERRY &
LAWRENCE CARTER-LONG, THE RUDERMAN WHITE PAPER ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE AND DISABILITY 2 (2016), https://rudermanfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ3
G-W3AA]. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed a bill (on 6/25/20) that would
fill this gap. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 223
(2d Sess. 2020). The bill would require reporting of “the national origin, sex, race, ethnicity,
age, disability, English language proficiency, and housing status of each civilian against
whom a local law enforcement officer or tribal law enforcement officer used force.” Id. Section 341 requires regulations for data collection that “provide[s] that the data collected
shall—(A) be disaggregated by race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, disability, and religion.” Id. § 341. Section 114 includes a provision for Law Enforcement Grants that describes pilot programs that must include “policies, practices, and procedures addressing
training and instruction to comply with accreditation standards in the areas of . . . (G) interactions with—. . . (ii) individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 114. It also requires “uniform
standards on youth justice and school safety” to consider “adolescent development and any
disability . . . .” Id. Section 364 “Peace Act” requires the Attorney General to provide guidance to Federal law enforcement agencies on “how a Federal law enforcement officer can—
. . . (ii) use the least amount of force when interacting with—. . . (IV) persons with mental,
behavioral, or physical disabilities or impairments.” Id. § 364. The Senate did not vote on
this bill before the end of the last session. Actions Overview of H.R.7120—George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act of 2020, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/7120/actions [https://perma.cc/3MLS-K2JX] (showing the last action
taken on the bill prior to the end of session was the Senate placing the bill on calendar as a
general order).
24
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category—“mental illness.”29 The information in these data sources is derived
from police and media reports and may widely undercount persons with disabilities because the databases categorize only by what they call “mental illness”
and do not categorize by other disabilities including hidden emotional and mental disabilities and all physical disabilities such as sensory perception disabilities.30 Moreover, even in the category of “mental illness,” the databases report
“mental illness” only when it has been mentioned specifically in a police report
or in the news media.31 It is likely, therefore, that the data on those with “mental illness” undercount those with psychiatric, intellectual, and emotional disabilities. Nonetheless, these databases, combined with other sources of data, including reports by foundations and advocacy organizations for persons with
disabilities, give us some idea of the prevalence of police violence against persons with disabilities. And, while they provide no empirical data that helps us
crunch the numbers, lawsuits alleging police brutality against persons with disabilities vividly illustrate police mistreatment of individuals with disabilities.32
Acknowledging that this information, even when combined, is not perfect, this
Part collects the data that is available. Based on the data catalogued and the stories told by the lawsuits, it is safe to say that there is a serious problem for not
only Black and Latinx individuals but more particularly for those individuals of
color who also have mental health disabilities (and particularly, for men of color with mental health disabilities).
A. Federal Database—The National Violent Death Reporting System
In 2002, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created the
federal database, the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS),

29

See, e.g., Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/gra
phics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/2QMW-GXGT]; Use of
Force, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=84 [https://perma.
cc/S8KX-NKCJ]. “Mental illness” used as a broad term does not always give us a clear idea
whether an individual has a disability or not. And, if so, what that disability is. See Emily
Bulthuis, Mental Illnesses: Terms to Use. Terms to Avoid., HEALTH PARTNERS, https://www.
healthpartners.com/blog/mental-illnesses-terms-to-use-terms-to-avoid/ [https://perma.cc/6Y6
6-5W5N]. The preferred term is “psychiatric disability.” See PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra
note 28, at 26.
30
See Tate et al., supra note 29; CONNOR BROOKS, ET AL., FEDERAL DEATHS IN CUSTODY
AND DURING ARREST, 2016–2017—STATISTICAL TABLES, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13 (2020), https://www.b
js.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdcda1617st.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6BQ-3V9V] (showing and describing the methodology used by the Bureau of Justice).
31
See Tate et al., supra note 29; A person with “mental illness” as reported by police or media may or may not necessarily be a person with a disability, but, given that the reports mention “mental illness” the behavioral issues identified by these reports likely come from disabilities such as a person with unmedicated bipolar disease, or schizophrenia. These would
most likely qualify as disabilities under the ADA.
32
See, e.g., Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 Supp. 3d 409, 412–14 (D. Md.
2015).
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which reports shooting deaths of civilians by police.33 By 2015, it covered only
twenty-seven states, but more recently, there is data from fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.34 Nonetheless, because of a lag in analyzing
the data and categorizing it, this information is currently available only from
thirty-four states up to 2017.35 A research report that analyzed the individual
data reported in the NVDRS for 2015 against five open sourced databases
found that the information in NVDRS coincides closely to that available on the
open source databases, and therefore the authors concluded the NVDRS is
comprehensive and largely accurate.36 While only general information is available to the public that does not include mental health status of individuals, with
special permission, researchers working on academic projects may at times access individual information that would include the mental health status of the
individual.37 Because I did not have access to the NVDRS individual data, I
take the research report noted here seriously and conclude that a good source
(or perhaps the best source right now) is the news service databases because not
only are they consistent with one another, but research demonstrates that the
data in these databases is also consistent with the data reported in the
NVDRS.38
B. News Service Databases
As noted, historically, there has been no official count of individuals killed
by the police nationwide.39 This failure has led to a number of open source materials published mainly by media. The Washington Post and The Guardian
have databases of persons shot and killed by the police for certain years.
The Washington Post’s database includes fatal shootings by on-duty police
officers of civilians from January 1, 2015 to the present.40 As of February 10,
2021, this national database reports, police had killed 6,032 civilians.41 Twenty33

CDC, CDC’S NATIONAL VIOLENT DEATH REPORTING SYSTEM (NVDRS), https://www.cdc.
gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NVDRS-factsheet508.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSR9-SPTC].
34
Id.
35
National Violent Death Reporting System, CDC (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/inj
ury/wisqars/nvdrs.html [https://perma.cc/3VAN-W54R].
36
See Andrew Connor et al., Validating the National Violent Death Reporting System as a
Source of Data on Fatal Shootings of Civilians by Law Enforcement Officers, 109 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 578, 578–83 (2019) (concluding that the NVDRS’ reporting of twenty-seven
states at the time of their research provided a “comprehensive count of fatal police shootings,” but because it takes nearly eighteen months for information to appear in the NVDRS
and it does not include other fatal encounters with the police, crowdsourcing materials from
the media should also be consulted for comprehensive information).
37
See, CDC, supra note 33.
38
See, e.g., Tate et al., supra note 29; CDC, supra note 33.
39
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
40
See Tate et al., supra note 29.
41
Id. As of February 10, 2021, police had killed 990 persons nationwide since February 10,
2020. Id. This number includes not only shootings but also police-related deaths caused by
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four percent of those shot and killed were black, seventeen percent were Latinx,
and forty-six percent were white.42 Black and Latinx civilians were killed at a
much higher rate than were white civilians: Blacks were killed at a rate of thirty-four per million; Latinx at a rate of twenty-six per million; and whites at a
rate of fourteen per million.43
As with the NVDRS, while there is no category for persons with disabilities as a comprehensive group, the Washington Post database allows a search
for persons with “mental illness” who have been killed by police.44 The definition of “mental illness” is not given, and the database includes this category only if the media reports from which the database draws its information have noted that the person had a mental illness.45 Nonetheless, using the “mental
illness” filter, the database reports that 1,397 people or 23 percent of persons of
all races killed over the past five and one-half years have been identified as experiencing “mental illness.”46 Two hundred twenty-two individuals or 4 percent
of those shot and killed by police were Black and identified as having a mental
illness; of those 220 individuals, 209 were male.47 One hundred eighty individuals or 3 percent of those shot and killed by police were Latinx and identified
as having a mental illness over the same time period; of those 180 individuals,
172 were male.48 These numbers very likely underestimate not only Black and
Latinx citizens with disabilities but all persons with disabilities who have been
shot and killed because the source of the information, police reports and media
reports, do not always mention that a person killed has a “mental illness” unless
it is obvious. Moreover, a “mental illness” as categorized here likely underestimates those with psychiatric, emotional, and intellectual disabilities and does
not even attempt to count those with physical disabilities who are killed by police.
The Guardian’s database covers 2015 and 2016 only, but it is more comprehensive in that it includes all persons who were killed by police whether
during arrest or in custody, by guns, taser, or other method.49 In the most recent
year recorded, 2016, according to this database, 1,093 persons were killed by
other means such as tasers and vehicles. Id.; see also Samuel Sinyangwe et. al., Mapping
Police Violence, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/planningteam [https://perma.cc/JXZ9-3LH5].
42
Tate et al., supra note 29.
43
Id.; see also Sinyangwe et. al., 2020 Police Violence Report, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE,
https://policeviolencereport.org/ [https://perma.cc/B32Y-DS76] (“Black people were more
likely to be killed, more likely to be unarmed and less likely to be threatening someone when
killed.”). The graph demonstrates the same for Latinx people. Id.
44
See Tate et al., supra note 29.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See Jon Swaine et. al., The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/about-the-counted
[https://perma.cc/8N9H-TP6R].
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the police in the United States, 266 (253 male) of whom were Black, 183 (181
male) of whom were Latinx, and 574 (532 male) of whom were white.50 These
numbers, which loosely track those found in the Washington Post database,
demonstrate that Blacks were killed at a disproportionate rate to their percentage of the population.51
C. Foundation and Advocacy Organization Reports
A report by the Ruderman Family Foundation52 estimates that persons with
disabilities account for one-third to one-half of all use-of-force incidents committed by the police.53 The Ruderman White Paper examines individual cases
and how they are reported by the media.54 It concludes that disability, along
50

Id.
In 2019, the census estimates that non-Hispanic white persons represent about 60% of the
population, while Black and Latinx persons represent 13.4% and 18.5% of the population.
See QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fac
t/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/AGE9-GG63]. According to The Guardian’s data,
whites killed by police equaled 53% of the total; Blacks killed by police equaled 24% of the
total; Latinx persons killed by the police equaled 17% of the total. See Jon Swaine & Ciara
McCarthy, Young Black Men Again Faced Highest Rate of US Police Killings in 2016, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2017, 7:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/08/thecounted-police-killings-2016-young-black-men [https://perma.cc/M7U2-R2F3]. Other databases that track police killings of citizens exist as well. They include: Sinyangwe et. al., supra note 41 (crowd sourced database that catalogues police killings of civilians by any
means and records police department, geography, race, whether the victim was armed, and
means of death); D. Brian Burghart, Methodology, FATAL ENCOUNTERS (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://fatalencounters.org/methodology [https://perma.cc/B2JM-CVNM] (database whose
goal is to record every police killing whether intentional or accidental from January 1, 2000
to the present; categories include: name, city, county, state, race, age, gender, year, date of
injury resulting in death, cause of death, and the police agencies involved); Gun Violence
Archive, GVA, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ [https://perma.cc/6EMH-WFJ3] (The
archive records all gun violence deaths including those perpetrated by police. The website
states, “Gun violence and crime incidents are collected/validated from 7,500 sources daily—
Incident Report and their source data are found at the gunviolencearchive.org.website.”).
52
Our Story, RUDERMAN FAMILY FOUND., https://rudermanfoundation.org/about-us/ourstory/ [https://perma.cc/G6QD-BRMB]. The Ruderman Family Foundation is a philanthropic
organization with the following mission:
51

The Ruderman Family Foundation believes that inclusion and understanding of all people is essential to a fair and flourishing community. Guided by our Jewish values, we advocate for and
advance the inclusion of people with disabilities throughout our society; strengthen the relationship between Israel and the American Jewish Community; and model the practice of strategic
philanthropy worldwide. We operate as a non-partisan strategic catalyst in cooperation with
government, private sectors, civil society, and philanthropies.

Id.
53

PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 7.
Id. at 1. This source, which is relied on heavily by researchers, is not accepted by all. Activists for persons of color with disabilities fault the report for not giving activists the credit
for their views and work. See Leroy F. Moore, Jr., et. al., Accountable Reporting on Disability, Race, & Police Violence: A Community Response to the “Ruderman White Paper on the
Media Coverage of the Use of Force and Disability,” HARRIET TUBMAN COLLECTIVE 1–3
(2016), https://docs.google.com/document/d/117eoVeJVP594L6-1bgL8zpZrzgojfsveJwcWu
54
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with race and class, create a higher incidence of intersectional harm caused by
the police, but even so, the fact that a victim has a disability is often ignored by
the press.55 When the media reports a disability, the Report notes, it evokes
sympathy for the victim or blames victims for their own deaths.56 Simultaneously, the Report concludes, the media represent Blacks as dangerous and violent, a depiction that affects (and likely reflects) implicit biases.57
The Report, which covers the period of 2013 through 2016, analyzes not
only empirical evidence of persons with disabilities who are injured or killed by
the police, but also stories of victims whose disabilities were either ignored or
used to distort the truth and blame the victim for their deaths.58 Examples include well-known cases: Eric Garner, who was severely asthmatic and morbidly obese, and who died in an illegal police chokehold in New York City;59
Freddie Gray, who had severe lead poisoning as a child that likely caused intellectual disabilities, and who died at the hands of Baltimore police who gave
him a “rough ride” to the police station;60 and Sandra Bland, who had depression and epilepsy, and who may have been suffering from withdrawal from her
epilepsy medications at the time of her death by suicide in a police holding
cell.61 All three of these victims were Black, and the intersection of race and
disability was hardly noted by the media.
The Report also discusses the cases of less well-known victims, like John
Williams, a deaf First Nation member who, when ordered by police coming
from behind him to drop a small knife he had in his hand, did not react, and
was gunned down by the police with five shots;62 like DeVaughn Frierson,
HpkNcs/edit [https://perma.cc/K2VA-PYGC]. They also note that the Report, by its failure
to recognize the importance of race to disability abuse by the police furthers a white supremacist agenda. Id. at 6. They state that the Report mentions intersectionality but does not do a
complete intersectional analysis, and that the two authors are white men, one of whom does
not have a disability. Id. at 1–2. This critique demonstrates that the Report lacks a deep analysis of the important intersection of race and disability and of the work of persons of color in
the disability community. The critique, however, does not seem to dispute many of the facts
and the statistics presented in this empirical study. See generally id.
55
PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 1.
56
Id. at 6. A meta-study of research studies on police use of force and persons with disabilities concluded that the terminology used by the studies can be not only discriminatory but
can also affect reality and the allocation of power. See Tyler Frederick et al., Police Interactions with People Perceived to Have a Mental Health Problem: A Critical Review of
Frames, Terminology, and Definitions, 13 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 1037, 1046–48 (2018). It
noted that different terminology was used without clear definitions and the most common
use of “persons with mental illness” raises questions of validity and precision. See id.
57
See PERRY & CARTER-LONG, supra note 28, at 4.
58
Id. at 1. The Report states: “ ‘The Counted’ tracks 27% of all individuals killed by police
in 2015 as having ‘mental health’ issues, or 270 people. The Washington Post currently reports 235 individuals with ‘signs of mental illness’ shot by police.” Id. at 7.
59
Id. at 15–16.
60
Id. at 16.
61
Id. at 17.
62
Id. at 18.
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Dwight Harris, Nicholas Kincade, and Brian Sterner, all of whom were wheelchair users who were dumped to the ground by police from their wheelchairs;63
and like Kajieme Powell and Kristiana Coignard, both of whom had psychiatric
disabilities, who were gunned down by police.64
The Ruderman Report also noted that the Treatment Advocacy Center estimates that one in four persons involved in fatal encounters with the police has
a severe mental illness; those with severe mental illness are sixteen times more
likely to be killed during an encounter with the police.65
These findings by The Ruderman Report confirm concerns about underreporting of persons with disabilities and their encounters with police. The next
subsection describes the allegations in court cases brought under both the ADA
and Section 1983 that tell vivid stories about police abuse of persons of color
(and white people as well) with disabilities.
D. Legal Stories
Stories abound in lawsuits against police and police departments that escalated dangerous situations in response to persons with disabilities. Here are only a few of them:
Miles Hall was a twenty-three-year-old black man who lived with his family in Walnut Creek, California.66 Diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder after
his family called the police for help transporting him to the hospital for an involuntary commitment proceeding, Hall was known to the police as a person
with a mental health disability and the police placed a “hazard” on his address.67 The hazard meant that if the police were called in the future to this address, officers would work to de-escalate the situation.68 The complaint alleged
that no responding officer followed the hazard when the family called subsequently to ask the police to transport Hall to the hospital.69 Instead, the officers
shot and killed Hall as he ran toward them with a gardening rod in his hand.70
Teresa Sheehan was a Japanese-American woman in her fifties with a psychiatric disability who lived in a group home.71 Her social worker became con63

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20–21.
65
Id. at 8; DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF
MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 1 (2015).
66
Hall v. City of Walnut Creek, No. C 19-05716, 2020 WL 408989, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
24, 2020) (denying in part and granting in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also
Walnut Creek Police Facing Lawsuit Over Fatal Shooting of Mentally Ill Man, CBS S.F.
(Sept. 12, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/09/12/miles-hall-walnutcreek-police-department-lawsuit-officer-involved-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/K84S-PDY3].
67
Hall, 2020 WL 408989, at *1.
68
Id.
69
Id. at *6.
70
Id. at *1.
71
Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert.
dismissed in part, City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015); see also
64
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cerned that her mental health was deteriorating because she stopped taking her
medications and eating; he thought she was a danger to herself and to others
when she threatened him when he attempted to perform a welfare check on
her.72 He called the police for help transporting Sheehan to the hospital for an
involuntary commitment under California law.73 When two police officers arrived, they opened Sheehan’s door with a key, and Sheehan threatened them
with a knife; the police retreated to outside Sheehan’s room.74 Rather than waiting for backup to de-escalate the situation even though they could hear the sirens of the backup officers, the officers broke down Sheehan’s door and pepper-sprayed her in the face.75 Sheehan threatened them with a knife again, and
they shot her five or six times.76 Sheehan survived the shooting but was gravely
injured.77
Gary Roell had schizoaffective disorder and paranoid delusions for years.78
He stopped taking his medication regularly, and when his wife was out of town,
he went to the neighbor’s house and threw a plant through her window.79 The
neighbor’s son called 911, and when officers arrived at the scene, Gary was in a
state of delirium and yelling something about water.80 The officers attempted to
control Gary a number of times and ultimately tasered him to the ground.81
Roell stopped breathing, and the paramedics were unable to revive him.82
Gerrit Vos, a young white man, was acting “erratically” and waving scissors when police were called to the scene at a 7-Eleven.83 Vos ran around the
store and yelled as other customers in the store continued to mill around; an
employee tried to remove Vos’s scissors and was cut.84 Police were aware that,
at one point, Vos simulated having a gun behind his back.85 Vos went into a
back room, and all of the employees and customers left the store.86 Police made
no attempt to communicate with Vos, but when police opened the front doors,
Sandra Allen, The Trials of Teresa Sheehan, CTR. FOR L., BRAIN & BEHAV. (July 9, 2015),
https://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/the-trials-of-teresa-sheehan/ [https://perma.cc/G6VR-VVUL].
72
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215; Allen, supra note 71.
73
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215.
74
Id.; Allen, supra note 71.
75
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215–16, 1219–20; Allen, supra note 71.
76
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1216.
77
Id. at 1215–16.
78
Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding lower court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 477–78.
82
Id. at 478.
83
Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (overturning the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, which held that the defendant’s action was objectively reasonable as a matter of law).
84
Id. at 1028–29.
85
Id. at 1029.
86
Id.
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Vos ran out with something in his hand above his head, and within seconds was
killed by two officers who shot Vos with AR-15s, even though there was another policeman who had a less-lethal weapon.87 Vos died on the scene.88 Only
eight seconds elapsed from the time that Vos left the back room until the time
when he was shot in front of the building.89 Officers at the scene were aware
that Vos was likely “mentally unstable” or under the influence of drugs, and
they discussed using non-lethal force.90 Vos had been diagnosed earlier with
schizophrenia;91 after his death, his blood tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine.92 The object in his hand turned out to be a metal display
hook.93
These stories put human faces on the victims of police action that may or
may not result from good intentions but that cause more harm than good. The
question is: How do we reduce police abuse of individuals of color with disabilities? The next Part describes the law, which to date has been inadequate in
solving this problem. But it also suggests the use of the ADA as a possible, partial solution to police brutality.
II. THE LAW AS REMEDY: CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND THE ADA
A. The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law and Qualified Immunity
Countless law review articles argue for changes in the federal judiciary’s
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure
law and the doctrine of qualified immunity as potential remedies to killings and
maimings by police of individuals suspected of criminal behavior.94 These articles, which analyze civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 198395 for violation of constitutional rights of the victims, clearly demonstrate that the federal
87

Id. at 1029–30.
Id. at 1030.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1029.
91
Id. at 1030.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48, 51,
88 (2018) (concluding that the doctrine of qualified immunity has no basis in common law
and, therefore, is illegal); Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52–53, (1989); Devon W. Carbado,
Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479,
1519–22 (2016) (arguing that one cause of police violence is qualified immunity).
95
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
88

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Id.
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judiciary’s interpretation of the law does little to protect individuals of color
from the excesses of the police.96 In fact, scholars perceive that a significant
number of these suits result in grants of defendants’ motions to dismiss and
summary judgment, leaving plaintiffs without remedies and police with little
disincentive to continue their methods of policing.97
I will not repeat the arguments contained in these articles, but instead I
briefly summarize the law as applied and critiques advanced by other legal
scholars. A search or seizure by the police is unconstitutional if it is held to be
unreasonable by the courts.98 There are a number of limitations on lawsuits
brought by individuals under Section 1983, however, which provides a federal
civil remedy for constitutional violations committed “under color of state
law.”99 First, in the context of a police brutality claim, the Supreme Court in
Graham v. Connor100 held that the standard for judging whether a police officer’s behavior is unconstitutional is “objective reasonableness,” and requires
consideration of the conditions at the time when the police officer who engaged
in a challenged search confronted the alleged victim.101 This standard has been
criticized repeatedly by law professors102 because it precludes consideration of
96

See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1519–23 (arguing that police are not deterred from acting
violently because of the interpretation of the qualified immunity doctrine, including the fact
that: 1) courts avoid determining whether there was a constitutional violation (the police behavior was unreasonable) and move directly to analyze whether the right was “clearly established;” 2) courts conclude the right was not clearly established unless nearly every police
officer would know about it; 3) courts look to similar cases and many require near identical
facts to the case at bar to determine that the right was clearly established; and 4) nearly all
officers who are found to have violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights are indemnified by police
departments for the damages); see also Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402–05
(S.D. Miss. 2020) (noting that qualified immunity and other limitations were added by the
courts to a statute whose purpose was to protect the people from the government but that
now with these restrictions the courts are protecting the government from the people).
97
See, e.g., Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding lower
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants).
98
See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1520.
99
A similar action against federal employees (including, for example U.S. border patrol)
who violate the U.S. Constitution or federal law was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389,
427 (1971).
100
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
101
Id. at 388, 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”).
102
See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectionality and Policing: Class and Excessive Force,
89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (proposing intersectionality theory analysis that
emphasizes the class structure to reveal excessive force doctrine as a means of boundary
management); Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police
Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 951, 998, 1000–04 (2020) (finding in an empirical study of
police shootings and comparing the circumstances of the shootings that twice as many blacks
are killed under the same circumstances as whites, and suggesting that the “objective reasonableness” standard is not actually objective as applied).
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an officer’s state of mind while simultaneously setting the default as no liability
on grounds that an officer is acting hastily.103
Moreover, because of the Eleventh Amendment, there is no remedy in
damages if the state (rather than a city or municipality) is the defendant.104
Most police departments are municipal or county entities rather than state entities, however, and therefore they can be sued for damages under Section
1983.105 But there is an important limitation on plaintiffs’ ability to prevail in
these suits: plaintiffs in a Section 1983 suit against a city or county must prove
the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.106 Thus, the behaviors of
a rogue police officer may not lead to a sustainable lawsuit against the police
department unless it was caused by the city or county’s policy, custom, or practice.
Individual police officers, however, may also be sued under Section
1983.107 The problem with these suits from the plaintiffs’ perspective is that the

103

Cooper, supra note 102.
The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
Bradford R. Clark & Vicki C. Jackson, The Eleventh Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-xi/interps/13
3 [https://perma.cc/8DFD-853H]. The Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly to prohibit
damages actions against states brought under federal law or the U.S. Constitution, including
by citizens of the state in question. Id. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal lawsuits
against states for damages unless the suits are brought pursuant to a statute that validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. Even where the state has immunity to damages lawsuits, plaintiffs may bring individual claims against state police officers for damages.
Id. Under Title II of the ADA, Eleventh Amendment immunity likely depends on the type of
claim brought by the plaintiffs. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513–14, 530–34
(2004) The Supreme Court held that Congress properly abrogated the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it comes to cases of denial of access to the courts for persons
with disabilities. Id. at 533–34. The plaintiffs were persons with paraplegia, one a criminal
defendant and one a court reporter, who could not appear in court because of the stairs in the
courthouse. Id. at 513–14. The Court emphasized that Title II protects a number of different
rights that derive from the constitution as well as other rights that may be considered less
important (such as the availability of seating for a hockey game), and it refused to hold that
in every instance Title II validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 530–
31. Nonetheless, it appears that when a statute protects the underlying Fourth Amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, as Title II does in the context of police
abuse of citizens with disabilities, Lane should govern.
105
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–390 (1989).
106
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (holding that a suit against
the city for constitutional violations requires a showing of either a finalized policy or a custom that has not been adopted as a policy); see also Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d
1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that under Monell, a city is liable if the plaintiff proves
an unreasonable use of force and that the city’s policy caused the constitutional wrong).
107
Teressa E. Ravenell & Armando Brigandi, The Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability,
Police Indemnification, and Financial Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L.
REV. 839, 840 (2017).
104
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courts have granted broad qualified immunity to individual police officers.108 A
Section 1983 suit against an individual police officer can proceed only if the
right violated was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.109
Although this formula appears sensible because its purpose is seemingly to give
notice to police officers before holding them liable, courts have interpreted
“clearly established” extremely narrowly, focusing on slight differences in fact
patterns between the earlier police behavior that was deemed unreasonable and
the police behavior that is before the courts, and concluding that these differences mean that the constitutional right was not clearly established in the case
at bar.110 This constitutional factual nitpicking has guaranteed that many police
officers faced with an alleged violation may not be held civilly liable unless the
circumstances are substantially similar to others in the past that courts have
deemed unconstitutional.111
Because of all these limitations, the potential for civil liability both of the
police departments and individual police based on violations of the Fourth
Amendment have had little apparent effect on deterring police misbehavior. 112
Currently, there is a movement in Congress to abolish qualified immunity for
individual police officers.113 This solution would hold more police officers individually liable for unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.114 It appears, however, that absent a Democratic majority in both
108

See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 62–65 (2016). But see Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified
Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9–10 (2017) (agreeing that Supreme Court and lower court
jurisprudence has favored defendants on qualified immunity but finding in a comprehensive
empirical study across five federal district courts that qualified immunity causes cases to be
dismissed on motions to dismiss or summary judgment in only 3.9% of cases).
109
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
110
See Tyler Finn, Note, Qualified Immunity Formalism: “Clearly Established Law” and
the Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2019).
111
See generally Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D. Miss. 2020). Cf.
Schwartz, supra note 108, at 10 (concluding based on a comprehensive empirical project
studying cases in five federal court circuits that qualified immunity does not necessarily protect police officers from discovery and trials in civil lawsuits).
112
See Carbado, supra note 94, at 1519–24.
113
H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).
114
A number of states have introduced bills limiting or abolishing qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Robert Storace, Police Accountability Bill Curbing Qualified Immunity Advance in
State Senate, LAW.COM (July 27, 2020, 6:35 PM), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2020/0
7/27/police-accountability-bill-curbing-qualified-immunity-advances-to-state-senate/ [https:/
/perma.cc/X73B-USV7] (Connecticut); Nicollette J. Zulli, Destined for Demise? The Fate of
the Qualified Immunity Doctrine Remains Uncertain Amid Newest Federal and State Policing Reform Efforts, WHITE-COLLAR CRIM. LAW (July 13, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/u
nitedstates/constitutional-administrative-law/965334/destined-for-demisethe-fate-of-the-qual
ified-immunity-doctrine-remains-uncertain-amid-newest-federal-and-state-policing-reform-e
fforts [https://perma.cc/3P3C-LCN5] (describing the federal bill introduced in the Senate as
well as bills introduced into the state legislatures in Massachusetts, Colorado, and New
York). There are also police departments that are prohibiting certain police practices such as
chokeholds. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Half of the Nation’s Largest Police Departments
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houses of Congress or even a filibuster-proof sixty vote super-majority, this bill
will not be enacted into law.115
To summarize Fourth Amendment law and its consequences, first, it is
very difficult to prove that a search or seizure is unreasonable. Second, even
where it is considered unreasonable, however, most governments employing
the police are not liable unless the police are acting pursuant to a policy or custom, and third, although lawsuits against individual police are possible, the
courts have liberally permitted individual police officers to claim qualified immunity.
An alternative to lawsuits for police abuse by persons with disabilities
based on constitutional violations is potentially Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which I discuss in the next subsection. This alternative, however, may be ineffective, depending on how courts interpret Title II in the circumstances of police arrests of persons with disabilities. If the courts interpret
Title II to give the broadest scope of coverage and the greatest protection to
persons with disabilities against police discrimination and brutality, Title II is
capable of providing needed relief in damages, and creating a disincentive for
police abuse of individuals with disabilities. If not, Title II may deny rights or
grant rights without remedies for individuals injured or killed by the police’s
failure to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities during arrests
and after.
The next Section analyzes Title II, how it has been applied by various
courts, and the web of barriers most of those courts create for individuals with
disabilities who seek to redress the police’s failure to grant Title II rights. It explains how the courts should rule properly under Title II to afford rights and
maximum deterrence of police abuse. Given that I am not confident that the
courts, as currently configured, will follow this broad coverage, in the alternative, this Section encourages Congress to once again revise the ADA to assure
the broad coverage that was envisioned first when the law was passed in 1990,
and second, when it was amended in 2008.116

Have Banned or Limited Neck Restraints Since June, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2020, 10:47 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/police-use-of-force-chokehold-car
otid-ban/ [https://perma.cc/P7AE-69Y4] (noting that at least thirty-two of the sixty-five largest police departments in the U.S. have banned or strengthened prohibitions on neck holds
since Floyd’s death).
115
Eric Boehm, Senate Republican Police “Reforms” Won’t Touch Qualified Immunity,
REASON (June 10, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://reason.com/2020/06/10/senate-republican-police-r
eforms-wont-touch-qualified-immunity/ [https://perma.cc/LLE4-6AF6]. But see Jordain
Carney, GOP Senator Introducing Bill to Scale Back Qualified Immunity for Police, THE
HILL (June 23, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/504065-gop-senator-i
ntroducing-bill-to-scale-back-qualified-immunity-for-police [https://perma.cc/56YH-8GP
M].
116
See infra notes 119–127 and accompanying text for a brief description of the history of
the ADA and its amendments.
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B. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Partial Solution
A possible, partial solution to the courts’ cramped interpretation of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.117
The ADA was passed in 1990 with a broad mission to eliminate discrimination
against and grant positive rights to persons with disabilities in employment,
public services, and public accommodations.118
Title II of the ADA applies to state, county, and city governmental entities
and makes it illegal to exclude from participation in government services or to
discriminate against individuals with disabilities in the provision of public services, programs, or activities.119 Title II requires that the government entity
make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to assure
the participation of persons with disabilities unless the defendant can demonstrate that the requested modifications fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.120 This aspect of the law creates affirmative obliga117

42 U.S.C. § 12132 states: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12131 states:
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Public entity
The term “public entity” means—
(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States
or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in
section 24102(4) of Title 49).
(2) Qualified individual with a disability
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by a public entity.

Id.
118

What is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (Jan. 2021),
https://adata.org/learn-about-ada [https://perma.cc/89M4-2646].
119
See supra note 117. The pertinent regulation states: “No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2008).
120
The pertinent regulation states: “A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2008).
Besides the defense of a fundamental alteration, in this situation, police departments argue that individuals pose a direct threat to the health or safety of themselves or others and
are therefore not qualified under Title II. The direct threat language states:
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tions that extend beyond the requirements of the other civil rights laws that
merely forbid discrimination.121 Because there are many social and physical
barriers to persons with disabilities and equal treatment requires removal of
those barriers wherever possible, the law requires affirmative action to do so.122
Early in the history of the ADA, the Supreme Court interpreted coverage of
the ADA narrowly—specifically in its definition of who qualifies as a person
with a disability.123 In response to these limiting decisions, in 2008, Congress
amended the ADA by passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (ADAAA) to assure broad coverage of the Act.124 The Amendments
broadly define who is a person with a disability and clearly were intended to
expand the coverage beyond the courts’ interpretation of the Act.125
(a) This part does not require a public entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit
from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.
(b) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a
public entity must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies
on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision
of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.

28 C.F.R. § 35.139 (2016).
121
See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectional Cohorts, Dis/ability, and
Class Actions, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 319, 324–25 (2020) (explaining that the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation requirement goes beyond the anti-discrimination requirements of
other civil rights laws).
122
Id.
123
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years after the
ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 383, 384–89 (2019).
124
See infra note 125.
125
Congress stated in its Findings and Purposes of the ADA:
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES OF PUB. L. 110–325 Pub. L. 110–325, §2, Sept. 25, 2008,
122 Stat. 3553, provided that:
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) [42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.],
Congress intended that the Act “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and provide broad coverage;
(2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated
attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers;
(3) while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted
consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.], that expectation has not been fulfilled;
(4) the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by
the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect;
(5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA;
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While the ADAAA did not explicitly amend Title II of the Act, which applies to governmental bodies other than the federal government, it did amend
the definition of “person with a disability,” and Congress instructed judges to
pay more attention to the defendant’s behavior (rather than the plaintiff’s status) to determine whether a violation of the Act has occurred.126 In essence,
Congress made clear that the ADAAA’s purpose was to assure broader protec-

(6) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual
cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities;
(7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term “substantially limits” to require a greater
degree of limitation than was intended by Congress; and
(8) Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term “substantially limits” as “significantly restricted” are inconsistent with
congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.
(b) PURPOSES—The purposes of this Act [see Short Title of 2008 Amendment note above]
are—
(1) to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing “a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination” and “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination” by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the
ADA;
(2) to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures;
(3) to reject the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of handicap under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms “substantially” and “major” in
the definition of disability under the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled,” and that to be substantially limited in performing a major
life activity under the ADA “an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives”;
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court in the case of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for ‘substantially
limits’, and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high
level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of
Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the
question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis; and
(6) to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will
revise that portion of its current regulations that defines the term “substantially limits” as ‘significantly restricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-55 (2008).
126
Id.
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tion for individuals with disabilities and to make proof of a disability easier to
accomplish.127
Individuals with disabilities (or the executors of their estates) have used Title II to argue that their deaths or injuries caused by the police violated the
ADA.128 The courts that hold that Title II applies to the police actions have
generally recognized three potential causes of action: wrongful arrest;129 failure
to reasonably accommodate (or make reasonable modification);130 and failure to
adequately train the police force.131 A failure adequately to train likely would
be a failure of the defendant city, county, or police force, but a failure to reasonably accommodate or modify policies and wrongful arrests likely will occur
during policing at the level of the individual police themselves. While all of the
circuits deciding the issue have agreed that Title II governs police interactions
with individuals with disabilities, there are a number of circuit splits and other
differences about how the lower courts interpret Title II and its relationship to
police behavior.132 An analysis of these issues appears in the next subpart.
127

Id.
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 133–37, 138, 178–81; supra notes 66–93.
129
This is a cause of action for an arrest of an individual for behavior that is not criminal
that the police mistake. An example is the situation where the police arrest for drunk driving
an individual who is driving erratically but the individual is not drunk but a diabetic who
needs insulin.
130
This is the most common cause of action, and it is commonly described as failure to reasonably accommodate rather than failure to make reasonable modifications in polices, practices or procedures. While the “reasonably accommodate” language comes from Title I, the
employment title of the ADA, the correct language is the “reasonable modification” language appearing in Title II. Nonetheless, it appears that the courts are analyzing the cases the
same way whether they are using the “reasonable modification” language or the “reasonable
accommodation” language. Another possible cause of action would hold the government liable for its failure to provide auxiliary aids and services, a cause of action that is described in
Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, 701 F.3d 334, 336 (11th Cir. 2012).
131
This is a cause of action that is less recognized by the courts but should also be a potential cause of action under Title II given that the defendants in Title II cases will always be the
city or other governmental entity for which the officers work and there is no cause of action
against individual defendants. The failure to adequately train the force takes into account the
failure to recognize the issues that arise with persons with disabilities and to instruct police
officers on how to reasonably modify their behaviors when faced with the situation of a person with disabilities. The legislative history of Title II of the ADA clearly demonstrates that
Congress contemplated that public services (governments) will be liable under the ADA if
they fail properly to train the police. For example, in a congressional hearing describing the
Act, Representative Steny Hoyer stated:
128

[T]itle II covers the range of services, benefits, and programs offered by State and local governments. It also includes providing training to public employees in order to ensure that discriminatory actions do not occur. For example, persons who have epilepsy are sometimes inappropriately arrested because police officers have not received proper training to recognize seizures and to
respond to them. In my (sic) situations, appropriate training of officials will avert discriminatory
actions.

101 Cong. Rec. E1913, E1916 (daily ed. June 13, 1990).
132
There are a number of good student notes on the topic of the different standards used by
different circuits. See generally, Robyn Levin, Note, Responsiveness to Difference: ADA Accommodations in the Course of an Arrest, 69 STAN. L. REV. 269 (2017); Andrew J.
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1. Application of Title II to Police Conduct
All courts dealing with the issue of whether Title II applies to police conduct look to the broad language of the statute, the legislative history, or both, to
conclude that police or other security forces’ conduct during arrests, interrogation, and imprisonment is covered by Title II of the ADA. These cases rely on
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey133 in reaching this conclusion. In Yeskey, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that Title II
does not apply to prisons because residing in a prison is not voluntary and held
that Title II applies to conditions, programs, and services in imprisonment.134
Using a textualist approach, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, dismissed the
argument that Congress did not intend for the ADA to apply to state prisons
stating, “the fact that a statute can be ‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.’ ”135
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on whether Title II can be
used to attack police misconduct during the arrest stage, lower courts have applied Yeskey to conclude that Title II applies to police misconduct in arrests,
interrogations, and investigations.136 A number of issues have developed among
the federal courts as to application of the law. These issues include:
Lohmann, Note, Arrests and Title II of the ADA: Framework of Claims for Monetary Damages, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 559 (2017). Because my space is limited, I will not repeat elaborate descriptions of the cases discussed in the student notes and the standards used by these
courts but will instead analyze how the courts apply those standards, and other pertinent issues regarding this topic that are not discussed in the student notes.
133
Pa. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998); see, e.g., Haberle v. Troxell,
885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that police can violate the ADA by failing to
make reasonable accommodations to an individual’s disability during an arrest); Seremeth v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs., 673 F.3d 333, 336–7 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that while the ADA is
applicable during arrests and officers are obligated to give a reasonable accommodation to
persons with disabilities, in the case at bar the officers acted reasonably as a matter of law).
But see Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ADA does
not protect individuals with disabilities in their dealings with police; the ADA is not applicable to officers’ on-the-street responses to disturbances).
134
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209–11.
135
Id. at 212 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985)). This language was recently reaffirmed in a Title VII case, Bostock v. Clay County, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1754 (2020), holding that discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination based on
an individual’s sexual orientation and/or transgender identity or status even though at the
time Title VII was passed Congress was likely not considering that sexual orientation or
trans identity would be protected from discrimination. Moreover, even without the decision
in Yeskey, lower courts could have relied on the legislative history, which makes clear that in
the very least a failure to train police would create liability under Title II. See supra note
131.
136
The major case holding that Title II does not apply until the police secure the scene is
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000). This is the minority view. In City of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2015), the Supreme Court dismissed the
Title II portion of the case because the City and County of San Francisco filed a cert petition
defining the issue as whether Title II applies to police behavior during an arrest, but in its

21 NEV. L.J. 1081

Spring 2021]

ENOUGH! ELIMINATING POLICE ABUSE

1103

•Whether Title II applies to police conduct occurring during an arrest or
seizure before the police “secure the scene;”
•Whether plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination (discriminatory
animus or deliberate indifference) to establish liability and/or to collect
damages under Title II of the ADA; and
•Whether in a Title II suit against a governmental unit the defendant is vicariously liable in respondeat superior for discriminatory acts by officers when engaged in arrests or investigations.137

In the next subsections, I analyze these three issues and ultimately conclude that under a proper, broad reading of the ADA, one sanctioned by the
drafters of the ADAAA Amendments, exigency should be analyzed as part of
the “reasonable modifications” analysis; that plaintiffs need not prove intentional discrimination (discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference) of the
police in order to recover damages against the governmental entity; and that
governmental entities should be liable vicariously in respondeat superior for the
illegal actions of its officers who act within the scope of their employment. To
the extent that courts disagree with these conclusions, I encourage Congress to
amend Title II of the ADA to accord necessary protection to individuals with
disabilities who deal with the police.
a. Reasonable Modifications Analysis: Applying Yeskey Before the
“Scene is Secured”
Given Yeskey, all lower courts deciding whether the ADA applies to police
conduct in the field have agreed that it does.138 But there is a difference among
the courts as to when Title II comes into play with policing. A majority of the
courts of appeals deciding this issue conclude that Title II is applicable to arrests, and that exigency arising during the arrest can be considered in determining whether a modification of policy, practice, or procedure is reasonable or
not.139 A small minority of federal courts conclude that Title II is not applicable
during arrest until after the police “secure the scene,” concluding that before
the scene is secured that exigency exists and applying Title II would not be reasonable as a matter of law.140
The majority is the better view because there is no specific “exigency” exception in the statutory language of Title II itself, and because, as a practical
matter, exigency will be considered in determining whether proposed modificabriefs did not challenge whether police behavior during arrests is covered by Title II but argued on narrower grounds that the plaintiff was not a “qualified” individual with a disability
because she posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others. In dismissing certiorari
on the Title II issue, the Court made clear that the question of whether Title II applies to arrests is not a settled question, at least when it comes to the time before the police secure the
scene. Id. at 610.
137
See infra Sections II.B.1.a; II.B.1.b; & II.B.1.c, respectively.
138
The U.S. Supreme Court questioned this analysis. See supra note 136.
139
See Levin, supra note 132, at 285–294.
140
Id. at 287.
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tions would have been reasonable under the specific circumstances.141 This is
an intensely fact-based analysis that should take account of how the scene unfolded and the how police officers’ actions affected the scene or perhaps even
caused more danger to the alleged victim. In fact, in a number of the reported
cases, it is the police’s aggressive behavior and failure to adapt procedures to
the individual with a known disability that creates the exigency in the first
place.142 In other words, it is the police’s failure to grant the victim a reasonable
modification that increases the danger that things will go astray. If we do not
consider police behavior at this stage, many unnecessary police-imposed deaths
and injuries will occur.
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan provides an example. In that
case, the officers seem to have acted reasonably when they first entered the victim’s room, and, when faced with Ms. Sheehan’s threats with a knife, the officers retreated, and called for backup.143 But for an unknown reason, even though
backup was on its way and the backup’s sirens could be heard by the officers at
the scene, minutes after retreating, the officers decided to re-enter the victim’s
room by breaking down her door.144 Because the victim was alone in her room
on the second floor, there was little chance that she would be a danger to herself or others during the time it would take for specially-trained backup officers
to arrive at the scene.145 Therefore, there was at least a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether waiting for the trained backup would constitute a reasonable
modification of a policy or practice (assuming there was a policy or practice
that would encourage immediate re-entry), especially given that the officers
knew that the victim was a person having a mental health crisis.146
The only defenses available to the reasonable modification requirement are
that the modification would “fundamentally alter” the public service147 or that
the alleged victim was not qualified under the ADA because she imposed a direct threat to health and safety of herself or others.148 If the public service here
is the police response to a call for help for a person experiencing a psychiatric
141

As explained in supra note 120, there is a defense if the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the service; moreover, in order to be a qualified individual with a disability, one must not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others.
142
See e.g., City of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 602–605 (2015).
143
See id. at 604. The facts recited in this section come from the courts’ opinions in response to the defense motion for summary judgment, and, therefore are described in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 603. I do not know whether these facts are all true, but
this lack of knowledge proves my point. Determining the facts and inferences drawn from
them is the factfinder’s job, and, given those facts, the jury should conclude whether there
was a reasonable modification that the officers should engage.
144
Id. at 605.
145
Id. at 603.
146
Id.
147
See supra note 120 for the language of Title II relating to the “fundamental alteration”
defense.
148
While the other titles of the ADA (such as Title I) have an explicit direct threat defense,
the defense to a Title II violation appears in the regulations. See supra note 120.
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crisis, there is little question that reasonably modifying the police’s ordinary
aggressive responses in order to de-escalate the conflict would not fundamentally alter the nature of their service. Moreover, the officers knew Ms.
Sheehan’s condition as they were briefed by the social worker when they arrived on the scene.149 Even though Ms. Sheehan had threatened them with a
knife, they also knew that the threat arose when and because they invaded her
space.150 There was at least a question of fact as to whether the police officers
had a reasonable concern that she would escape or was in imminent danger of
harming herself in her room. For this reason, and given that the officers could
hear their counterparts arriving at the location, a reasonable jury could conclude
that it was unreasonable for them to aggravate Ms. Sheehan’s fear by escalating
the violence of the police action and breaking down her door to re-enter, which
they should have expected would re-trigger her fearful reaction. A reasonable
modification of their policies and procedures that would accommodate Ms.
Sheehan and decrease the danger to both Ms. Sheehan and the officers would
have been, a jury could conclude, to wait the few minutes for backup to arrive
and to plan with their more experienced counterparts how to de-escalate the situation.151
Certainly, when the police create the circumstances that lead to the exigency, the department should not be able to defend against a civil lawsuit under the
ADA by claiming that it would have been unreasonable for them not to use lethal force against the alleged victim. In other words, the police’s role in creating the exigency needs to be taken into account in determining whether the police should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Sheehan or made reasonable
modifications to their policies and procedures. It is for this reason that the exigency of the situation needs to be analyzed to determine whether there was a
plausible reasonable modification available. Police officers’ inappropriate rushing into a scene and making the matter worse must be considered in determining whether the police’s response violated Title II.
The next Subsection discusses what state of mind of the actors is necessary
to impose liability and/or damages under Title II. An intricately related ques149

Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 603–04.
Id.
151
The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both
the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim and the ADA Title II count,
which alleged that the police officers failed to make a reasonable modification of their procedures even though they were fully aware that the plaintiff was experiencing a psychiatric
crisis. Sheehan v. City of S.F., No. C 09-03889, 2011 WL 1748419, at *7, *10–11 (N.D. Cal.
May 6, 2011). The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment,
concluding that, in the Title II claim, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the
officers reasonably accommodated the alleged victim. Sheehan v. City of S.F., 743 F.3d
1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on both counts, reversed on the Fourth Amendment claim, and dismissed the certiorari on the ADA claim
when the defendants took a different position than they had taken in the cert petition.
Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 606. The petition for certiorari dismissal by the Supreme Court means
that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Title II of the ADA is still good law in the circuit.
150

21 NEV. L.J. 1081

1106

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

tion follows in Subsection c, which addresses whether municipalities or other
government agencies operating police departments should be subject to vicarious liability for the police officers’ actions under Title II, and if so, the guiding
principles for liability.
b. Requiring Proof of Intent for Liability? Damages?
Although Title II of the ADA does not mention intent, many courts have
adopted an intent requirement for liability of the public services under Title II
and all appear to require an intent showing for damages under Title II.152 The
majority of courts seem to agree that the proper intent standard is “deliberate
indifference,” rather than discriminatory animus.153 The deliberate indifference
standard is drawn from the Supreme Court’s standard in Title VI and Title IX
cases.154 The reasoning is complicated, but appears simple. The text of Title II
of the ADA states, “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this
subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.”155 In turn, the Rehabilitation
Act incorporates “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”156 Title VI uses the same remedies as those
available in Title IX.157 The Court has held that both Title VI and Title IX use
the “deliberate indifference” standard for liability of the government entity.158
Therefore, the argument goes, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II
of the ADA use the intent standard, which is usually adopted as a “deliberate
indifference” standard.159
152

Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1417–18 (2015); see also Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 431 (7th Cir.
2020); Silberman v. Mia. Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that
in order to collect damages, there must be a showing of deliberate indifference in a Title II or
Section 504 case); Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that deliberate indifference rather than discriminatory animus is the proper state of
mind for liability under Title II); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that deliberate indifference must be shown before the plaintiff may collect
damages under Title II); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that deliberate indifference required for compensatory damages under Title II of the
ADA and Section 504).
153
See, e.g., Liese, 701 F.3d at 345; Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138–39.
154
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 224, 274 (1998).
155
42 U.S.C. § 12133.
156
29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2).
157
See Jones v. City of Detroit, No. 17-11744, 2019 WL 2355377, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 4,
2019); Weber, supra note 152, at 1436.
158
See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280 (Title VI); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274 (Title IX).
159
According to the court in Jones:
[W]hen analyzing the ADA’s remedial scheme, the law operates like a matryoshka doll. To determine whether a particular remedy is available under the ADA, the Court looks at its remedial
scheme, which looks to the Rehabilitation Act, which looks to Title VI, which looks like Title
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The Eleventh Circuit in Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District defined “deliberate indifference.” It occurs when ‘“the defendant knew that harm
to a federally protected right was substantially likely and . . . failed to act on
that likelihood.”’160 The court noted that deliberate indifference goes beyond
gross negligence,161 and it stated that “discriminatory animus,” which is not required to prove a violation, would require “a showing of prejudice, spite, or ill
will.”162 In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, the Ninth Circuit, like all other circuits
deciding these cases, held that in order to collect damages under Title II, the
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination; the court then adopted the deliberate indifference standard to fulfill the intent requirement.163
In the face of the courts’ adoptions of an intent requirement for liability
and/or damages under Title II, Professor Mark Weber, a well-respected academic and scholar of the ADA, argues convincingly that, at least for some of
the Title II causes of action, proof of intent should not be required. Weber
makes a sophisticated argument based on Title II’s statutory language and Supreme Court caselaw. In Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law,164 Weber argues that the lower courts’ reasoning rests on erroneous assumptions.165 Weber relies on Alexander v. Choate166 and Barnes v.
Gorman167 to demonstrate that a showing of intent (or deliberate indifference)
should not be required for damages or monetary relief under Title II in reasonable modifications cases.168 He explains that it makes sense to apply the Title
VI and Title IX requirements of “deliberate indifference” in order to assess
monetary relief and/or damages under certain Title II provisions—those that
require a showing of intent in order to prove liability.169 But with Title II proviIX. Consequently, precedent interpreting the remedies available under Title VI or Title IX must
be considered when analyzing the ADA’s remedial scheme.

Id. at *5.
160
Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010)).
161
Id. at 344.
162
Id.
163
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). For other cases holding
that a showing of deliberate indifference is necessary to recover damages in a Title II case,
see supra note 152.
164
See Weber, supra note 152 at 1450–64 (2015) (explaining the three errors that lower
courts have committed when requiring a showing of intent for reasonable modifications cases under Title II: 1) Misguided analogies to Title VI and Title IX cases: 2) Reliance on dicta
from a 1982 education case despite a legislative overruling of the dicta; and 3) A misstatement as to a perceived (but non-existent) conflict between the IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
165
Id.
166
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 (1985).
167
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that the plaintiff in a Title II suit
could recover compensatory damages but not punitive damages without proof of intent in a
failure to accommodate case).
168
See Weber, supra note 152, at 1448–50.
169
In Barnes, the Supreme Court stated:
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sions that do not require such a showing for proving liability, such as the reasonable modifications requirement, it does not follow that intent must be
proved for a damages award.170 This is the case because Titles VI and IX, unlike Title II, always require a showing of intent for liability because they do not
recognize either disparate impact or reasonable modifications causes of action,
both of which do not require a showing of intent for liability.171 Title II, in contrast, provides for disparate impact and reasonable modifications/accommodations causes of action in addition to intentional violations.172
As Professor Weber explains, Barnes173 and the legislative history of the ADA
lend strong support to his argument.174 In Barnes, a reasonable modifications
case involving police transportation of an individual with paraplegia, the Supreme Court held that because Titles VI and IX were passed pursuant to the
Spending Clause of the Constitution, and ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act remedies are coextensive with those available in a Title VI private
cause of action, contract remedies are appropriate.175 Thus, compensatory damages are available under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
when the plaintiff proves the underlying requirements for liability, but punitive
damages are not.176 This conclusion fits with the legislative history of both the
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Professor Weber concludes:
Thus, broad remedies, consistent with concepts of reasonable expectations of
loss, and including compensatory damages and other monetary relief, are available for violations of section 504 and the ADA’s reasonable accommodations and
disparate impact discrimination provisions. The legislative history of Title II
emphasizes that a wide range of remedies exists for violations of the statute. The
House Committee Report states that Congress intended to make the “full panoply of [section 504] remedies available” in Title II cases, and cited a case
providing damages against a governmental unit under section 504.177

[T]he remedies for violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which prohibits racial discrimination in
federally funded programs and activities.

536 U.S. at 185.
170
Weber, supra note 152, at 1441–44.
171
Id. at 1440.
172
Id. at 1445–49.
173
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 181.
174
Professor Weber also argues, by analogy, that the remedies under Title I of the ADA,
which vary depending on the state of mind required for proof of liability, support his argument. See Weber, supra note 152, at 1429.
175
Id. at 1448–49.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1449 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101–485, pt.3, at 52 n.62, as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 475 n.62 (citation omitted)).
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Professor Weber’s reasoning is correct. The court in I.L. through Taylor v.
Knox County Board of Education178 relied on Weber’s reasoning when it explained:
People can sue only for intentional violations of Title VI. So one might think
that people can sue only for intentional violations of Title II and § 504. Not so.
While the Supreme Court has not outright said that § 504 covers unintentional
discrimination, it has rejected the idea that § 504 covers only intentional discrimination. And Title II, for its part, “concerns more than intentional discrimination.” Thus—despite the “remedies, procedures, and rights” language linking
Title II, § 504, and Title VI—the first two diverge from Title VI at this point.
They all contain an implied right to sue, but only Title II and § 504 cover both
intentional and unintentional discrimination. Title II and § 504 provide greater
rights than does Title VI. . . .
The next question—the real question here—is what a plaintiff must show to
win an injunction, and what she must show to win damages. Barnes v. Gorman
is instructive. In Barnes, the Supreme Court ruled that Title II and § 504 plaintiffs can win injunctions and compensatory damages but not punitive damages.
The plaintiff had sued for failure to accommodate his disability. . . .
The defendant had unintentionally violated the plaintiff’s Title II and § 504
rights, and so had to make good the wrong done by giving him damages. This
suggests that a plaintiff can recover damages under Title II and § 504 without
proving intent. . . .
It follows that a plaintiff can win an injunction under Title II and § 504
without proving intent. Intent does not separate injunctions from damages. What
really separates them is that injunctions may be awarded when damages would
not be adequate to make up for the plaintiff’s harm. . . . What a plaintiff must
prove at the merits stage is independent of what she must prove at the remedies
stage.
And that is the key here: at the remedies stage. Eight courts of appeals require that a plaintiff prove some mental state before winning damages under Title II and § 504. . . .
T[heir] reasoning, however, reads Guardians and Sandoval too narrowly.
True, the Court did hold that intentional discrimination is required for damages
under Title VI. But the Court held that intentional discrimination is required for
any remedy under Title VI, as Title VI protects against only intentional discrimination. So a Title VI plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to win on
the merits, not to get a specific remedy. And by reading Sandoval and Guardians too narrowly, courts have taken this element of a Title VI claim and made it
the standard for Title VI damages. So these courts now say that intentional discrimination is the standard for Title II and § 504 damages. . . .
There is nothing to indicate that a plaintiff must ever prove intentional discrimination—or deliberate indifference—under Title II and § 504. What’s more,
the Supreme Court has upheld a damages award in a Title II case involving no
intent element. And . . . eight courts of appeals . . . have misconstrued Supreme
Court case law.179

178
179

I.L. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 946, 967–69 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
Id. (citations & footnote omitted) (emphasis and indentations added).
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Unfortunately, it appears that no other courts have agreed. Nonetheless, Title II should not require a showing of intent in reasonable modifications cases
for either equitable relief or compensatory damages. To make matters worse,
the courts have applied the “deliberate indifference” standard unevenly, with
the majority of published opinions interpreting “deliberate indifference” to be
an “exacting” standard.180
Gray v. Cummings181 is a good example of this trend. In Gray, the plaintiff
experienced a “manic episode” and called the police.182 She was transported to
the hospital and held there pursuant to statute against her will.183 A few hours
later, the plaintiff escaped from the hospital, and the hospital called the police.184 Officer Cummings responded, saw Gray walking on the sidewalk, and
approached her.185 When she did not follow his instructions and cursed at him
repeatedly, he took her down to the ground, and when she continued to be uncooperative, he tased her in drive-stun mode.186 Gray suffered extreme pain
from the tasing, and ultimately sued the police department and Cummings under various statutes.187 In the Section 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, the First Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that Cummings
engaged in the unconstitutional use of excessive force against the plaintiff, but
it also held that as a matter of law, the defendant Cummings was protected by
qualified immunity.188 In the ADA claim, the court held, assuming that deliberate indifference was a necessary showing for damages, that there was insufficient evidence from which one could conclude that Cummings demonstrated
deliberate indifference.189 The court set out the standard:
[T]o hold the Town vicariously liable under Title II based on Cummings’s deliberate indifference, Gray would have to show that Cummings knew that Gray
had a disability that required him to act differently than he would otherwise have
acted, yet failed to adjust his behavior accordingly. Thus, to prevail on her version of the “effects” theory, Gray would at least have to show that Cummings
knew that her failure to follow his orders was a symptom of her mental illness
rather than deliberate disobedience (warranting criminal charges). Similarly, to
prevail on her version of the “accommodation” theory, Gray would at least have
to show that Cummings knew that there was a reasonable accommodation,
which he was required to provide.190
180

See, e.g., McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th
Cir. 2014).
181
Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2019).
182
The following description of the facts is written in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
because of the procedural posture of the case. These facts appear in id. at 6–7.
183
Id. at 6.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 6–7.
187
Id. at 7.
188
Id. at 8, 13.
189
Id. at 17 (citing Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003)).
190
Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
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Curiously, the court concluded that even though Cummings knew of the
plaintiff’s mental illness, and that it was sufficiently severe for her to be hospitalized against her will, there was no evidence of Gray’s “particularized
knowledge about the nature or degree of Gray’s disability.”191 And, according
to the court,
[w]ithout such particularized knowledge, Cummings had no way of gauging
whether the conduct that appeared unlawful to him [her verbal resistance to arrest] was likely to be a manifestation of the symptoms of Gray’s mental illness. . . . [and he] had no way of gauging what specific accommodation, if any,
might have been reasonable under the circumstances.192

Moreover, the court held, that without evidence that Cummings knew of
the existence of national police standards of dealing with individuals with mental illness the plaintiff’s case would fail.193 In essence, the court ruled “ ‘falling
below national standards does not, in and of itself, make the risk of an ADA
violation’ so obvious as to eliminate the knowledge requirement.”194
Gray demonstrates the difficulty of proving deliberate indifference of the
police, at least as the court interprets it. This case, on whose panel sat former
Justice Souter of the Supreme Court, raises serious questions about whether the
ADA, as currently interpreted to require deliberate indifference, could ever be
used to assure rights of persons with disabilities in police confrontations.195
Cummings clearly knew of the mental disability of his subject, but nonetheless,
he tasered her, even though she was presenting no threat to herself or others,
and he got away with it.
c.

Vicarious Liability? Respondeat Superior and Other Tests

Closely related to the question of whether intent is required for liability
and/or damages under the reasonable modifications requirement of Title II of
the ADA are other questions that courts have addressed concerning government
liability—including the proper standard for attributing liability to the government entity for its police officers’ behavior.196
In answering these questions, it is crucial to understand that under Title II
of the ADA there is no right to a suit against individual defendants.197 The de191

Id.
Id.
193
Id. at 18–19.
194
Id. at 19 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2018)).
195
See id. at 5.
196
See, e.g., Ravenna v. Vill. of Skokie, 388 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1004–07 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (discussing debate over imposing respondeat superior or vicarious liability in Title II ADA cases
where there is no individual liability).
197
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided this issue, but nearly all lower courts facing this
question have concluded (based on analysis of Title VII and the ADEA) that there is no individual liability under the ADA. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610
(2015) (“Only public entities are subject to Title II”); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Under Title II of the ADA . . . the proper defendant is that ‘entity.’ . . . [A]s
192
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fendant in ADA suits, therefore, unlike those in lawsuits brought under Section
1983, will always be the government entity controlling the police department,
not individual police officers. And, because employers are commonly responsible under respondeat superior for the negligent acts of their employees committed in the scope of employment, one could argue that it follows that the government body that directs the police department should be liable not only
directly for injuries caused by their own violations of the ADA but also vicariously for violations of individual police officers who engage in wrongful arrest
or a failure to accord reasonable modifications to citizens with disabilities in
the field.198 Nothing in the ADA contravenes this fact.
Furthermore, unlike lawsuits filed under Section 1983, those filed under
the ADA against police departments should not necessarily require a showing
of a departmental policy or practice. Title II explicitly creates affirmative obligations on the public entities, requiring them to make reasonable modifications
to policies and practices unless doing so would fundamentally alter the service
rendered. Moreover, Title II:
expressly provides that a disabled person is discriminated against when an entity
fails to “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”
A plain reading of the ADA evidences that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on public entities to create policies or procedures to prevent discrimination based on disability. Thus, although it is true that for claims asserted
under § 1983, an official policy must be identified, the same rule cannot be reconciled with Congress’s legislative objectives in enacting the ADA and the [Rehabilitation Act]. . . .199

Despite this difference between lawsuits under Section 1983 and Title II of
the ADA, courts have apparently transported concepts from Section 1983 suits
into Title II actions. Some courts have required a policy or custom of the gov-

a rule there is no personal liability under Title II[.]”); see, e.g., Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490
F.3d 826, 829–30 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no individual liability under Title I
of the ADA); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that in
Title II cases of the ADA there is no qualified immunity because there is no individual liability; only the agency is liable under the Act); E.E.O.C. v. A.I.C. Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276, 1279–82 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that under Title I of the ADA there is no individual liability because the purpose of the statute was to impose respondeat superior liability
on the employer for the agents’ acts). But see Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161,
1164, 1186 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is individual liability in a retaliation suit under the ADA). Individual liability may exist, however, under state disability discrimination
statutes.
198
But see Ravenna, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (stating that in the Seventh Circuit if there is
no individual liability there is no vicarious liability of the governmental entity).
199
Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)
(also noting that although there is no intent standard for proving violations of Title II, it is
necessary to prove intentional discrimination to collect damages under Title II).
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ernmental unit to allocate responsibility to it.200 Others, as analyzed above, have
required a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of officers involved,
either to prove liability or to collect compensatory damages.201 Moreover, some
courts add an additional requirement. They require not only a showing of deliberate indifference of the employees who are on the front lines, but also evidence that the employees’ acts can be attributable to the government entity. In
Liese, for example, the court referred to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,202 a Title IX case, and concluded that respondeat superior was
not the proper standard under Title II for the governmental liability.203 For liability to attach to the hospital, there must be an official involved in the discriminatory practice who “[has] the knowledge of and the authority to correct [the
hospital’s] . . . discriminatory practices.”204 In that case, then, doctors, who had
the authority to overrule nurses’ behaviors, would create liability on the part of
the county when operating in the county hospital, but nurses would not.205
In contrast, in Duvall, the Ninth Circuit held that the county was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees in respondeat superior and did not go
through the same analysis as Liese in determining the organizational liability
for its employees’ behaviors.206 In other words, under Duvall, it is not necessary to demonstrate that an officer who violates a civilian’s Title II rights is an
official who has the responsibility to affirmatively act to correct the error. It is
sufficient that the officer failed to make reasonable modifications to policies
and practices of the public service in order to accommodate the civilian with a
disability. This is true to find a violation by the public service or governmental
organization of Title II. But—and this is an important exception—Duvall, as
noted above, also held that a showing of deliberate indifference is required for
200

But see Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (policy or
custom not required for ADA liability); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to actions under
§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act and specifically distinguishing Section 504 claims from § 1983
claims).
201
See supra Section II.B.1.b.
202
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 276, 290–91 (1998) (concluding in
a Title IX case that deliberate indifference is the proper standard for determining whether a
school is responsible for sex discrimination by its staff or students).
203
Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 349 (11th Cir. 2012).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 350.
206
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, T.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. School Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the ADA allows for
vicarious liability of the governmental organization under a theory of respondeat superior);
Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574–75 (holding that proof of a policy or that the actor in question
was a policymaker is not required under the ADA, and that there is respondeat superior liability, but that plaintiffs must prove that there was discriminatory intent to collect damages);
Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (concluding that whether the government
is liable under Title II of the ADA only for actions of employees who are officials with power to change the situation or whether respondeat superior is the proper standard is an open
question).
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the plaintiff to collect damages. Given the near impossibility of attaining injunctive relief, Duvall’s ruling on respondeat superior may be an empty victory
for plaintiffs.207
When Congress passed the ADA and then years later amended the ADA
with the ADAAA in order to assure greater coverage of the Act and protection
of persons with disabilities, it communicated a vision for broad coverage of the
Act. Given this legislative purpose, it is difficult to reconcile these cases that
make it nearly impossible to grant a remedy to victims of police abuse. Therefore, without openly addressing the fact, these cases interpret Title II to provide
a right without a remedy. This cannot be how Congress intended that the courts
interpret the Act.208
2. Potential Judicial? Congressional? Solutions
An ideal scenario would be for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on
these difficult, interpretive Title II issues and to hold, consistent with the congressional purpose of granting broad rights to persons with disabilities under
both the original ADA and as amended under the ADAAA that: 1) Title II covers police encounters with civilians and the issue of danger is ordinarily a
question of fact that bears on the reasonableness of potential accommodations
and/or modifications; 2) Because intent is not required in a Title II reasonable
accommodation/modification case to prove liability, neither is it required to recover compensatory damages under Barnes v. Gorman;209 3) Government entities employing police are vicariously liable for the Title II violations that police
engage in when acting in the scope of their employment; and 4) Government
entities employing police are directly liable without a showing of custom or
practice for their negligence in failing to train or supervise police if it causes
injury to civilians.
207

For persons with disabilities who are stopped illegally by the police, it will be nearly impossible to prove that they are entitled to an injunction because in order to receive injunctive
relief they must prove that they will be subject to the same treatment again. As the court in
Gray v. Cummings stated,
Past injury, in and of itself, “is an insufficient predicate for equitable relief.” To have standing to
pursue injunctive relief, a plaintiff must “establish a real and immediate threat” resulting in “a
sufficient likelihood that [s]he will again be wronged in a similar way.” . . . Gray cannot clear
this hurdle. When all is said and done, it is not enough for Gray to show that because she has bipolar disorder, she is likely to encounter the police again. She must show that she is likely to be
tased once more, and she has not managed any such showing.

917 F.3d at 19 (citations omitted).
208
The U.S. Supreme Court raised without deciding the question of whether the city and
county are vicariously liable for police officers’ behavior that occurs with deliberate indifference. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 608–10, (2015) (dismissing the
grant of certiorari as improvidently granted in the Title II portion of the case); discussion
supra note 151.
209
The Court should conclude, based on Professor Weber’s analysis that this is so even
though Title VI and Title IX cases do not permit compensatory damages absent a showing of
deliberate indifference.
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Given the current composition of the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts as well as the federal courts’ history of cutting back unreasonably on the
rights of persons with disabilities granted by the ADA, I have little confidence
that either the lower courts or the Supreme Court will decide these issues in an
appropriate manner. If the Court does not decide these issues favorably to
plaintiffs in the near future, and other circuits continue to hold that damages are
not available where there is no showing of intent, Congress should take action
again.
Congress should amend the statute to clarify that Title II remedies include
damages upon a showing of a violation of the statute in the reasonable accommodation/modifications context. Congress should make clear that those portions of the statute do not require intent for liability, and, therefore, do not require proof of intent for damages. Moreover, Congress should make clear that:
1) In suits against the city, county or police department, governmental immunity is waived by Title II and there is no need to prove a policy, custom, or practice of discrimination in order to recover; 2) Government employers are liable
vicariously in respondeat superior for the actions of employees acting within
the scope of their employment under Title II; and 3) There is no requirement
under Title II for liability or the recovery of damages or other monetary or equitable relief for proof of an intent to discriminate or deliberate indifference on
the part of the government or its employees.
CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There is plenty of room in Title II law to alleviate the severe problem of
police abuse of people of color with disabilities. I have outlined how courts
should interpret Title II of the ADA to assure more careful and respectful
treatment of the most vulnerable members of our society in the policing context. If the ADA is not interpreted as I suggest, it is not doing the job envisioned by Congress when it first enacted the ADA in 1990 and when it amended the Act to assure broad coverage for individuals with disabilities in 2008. If
courts refuse to heed this argument, Congress should once again take action to
amend the ADA to clearly protect persons with disabilities from police misconduct. Even if the courts refuse to rethink their interpretation of Title II and
Congress chooses not to act, individual states have laws that protect persons
with disabilities that could be interpreted in a broader fashion than the federal
law. And, state legislatures can assure such broad interpretations by amending
their laws to clearly protect individuals with disabilities in contact with police.
Police departments can institute new policies and procedures to protect the
most vulnerable among us.
But even if all of the interpretations of the laws and amendments to the
laws suggested are followed, more is necessary to assure safety of persons of
color with disabilities. We need structural changes to police organizations, including the ways that police departments are organized and how police are
trained. We need increased monetary support for social service agencies that
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take the lead in assuring that all members of society—including the most vulnerable persons—will be treated fairly and with respect. In essence, legal, organizational, and societal change must occur before this problem is solved.
While I leave for another day a discussion of the organizational and social
changes that should take place, it is important that not only legal, but also social
reform occur. In the meantime, both the courts and state and federal legislatures
should take the mantle of interpreting existing law and drafting new legal provisions that will assure broad protections of persons with disabilities. These
protections will aid not only those who are of color but also those who are
white, and they will go a long way to creating models in training and regulations for how police should act with the most vulnerable civilians.

